Analysis of Seahawks 2007 Free Agent Class

Since 2010, the Seahawks have gone 129-81, reached the playoffs nine times, won the NFC West five times, and won the franchise’s first Super Bowl. Over the past two decades, few executives have had a more excellent record of long-term success.
But if there’s one area where Schneider has repeatedly failed in his 12 years, it’s free agency, where Seattle has battled terribly to strengthen its team in one of the most critical aspects of the roster-building process.

His moves to bring in veterans have backfired mainly, contributing significantly to the team’s continuous slide over the last five years, including a disastrous 7-10 result in 2021. It’s also a big reason why star quarterback Russell Wilson is still looking for a new team to play for, and trade speculations abound

What has turned out badly for Schneider and the front office in the free organisation prominent? While the establishment hasn’t had as much spending power as different groups in many occurrences because of costly players currently on the books,

The repeated procedure of loading up on mid-level deal signings and keeping away from more worthwhile interests in prominent game-changing players have demonstrated to be inadequate throughout every year

Glancing back at Schneider’s specialist classes, it doesn’t take long to sort out why the Seahawks haven’t had the option to get back to the situation with an authentic title competitor in the NFC.

Taking on a close incomprehensible errand, we returned to each external free specialist marking Schneider has made tracing back to January 2017, reviewing each move in light of agreement length, yearly compensation, and, particularly, on-field creation. Continue forward to see the rankings with alert assuming you dare

Grade: D (64.0)
Best Signing: Bradley McDougald
Most exceedingly terrible Signing: Luke Joeckel/Eddie Lacy
On the off chance that there’s a year where Schneider’s arbitrary dependence on marking or procuring bombed high draft picks from the notorious 2013 NFL Draft arrived at its pinnacle, it must be 2017. As anyone might expect, the outcomes were downright a fiasco and assumed a critical part in the group missing the end of the season games without precedent for six years.
In the first place, Schneider raced to open up Seattle’s chequebook to reprehensibly offer against himself and give Joeckel, who played himself out of a beginning position with the Jaguars as a previous top-three pick, a one-year bargain worth $8 million.
While he began 11 games at left watchman and played well in a couple of those games, he gave up five sacks and 28 tensions before being lost for the season to a knee injury, taking $8 million in what turned out to be his last year in the association.
Yet, Schneider didn’t stop there. He gave previous Packers running back Eddie Lacy, who had eaten right out of Titletown, a one-year bargain worth $4.25 million, trusting he could rediscover his 2013/2014 structure. That didn’t occur as the previous second-balance pick of Alabama made an appearance to camp drifting around 250 pounds and neglected to have an effect in the backfield, scrambling for only 179 yards, a grim 2.6 yards for each convey normal, and no scores while dominating more at falling over than really running the football in nine games. Like Luke Joeckel, he was out of the association after a solitary season in the Pacific Northwest.
The choice to take a flier on ex-Dolphin’s top-five pick Dion Jordan wasn’t precisely as heartbreaking. He played on an association most minor agreement after least agreement after being out of the association for a very long time; he gave 4.0 sacks in the Seahawks last five games. Tragically, that was all they had the option to see from him, as a knee injury kept him out the more significant part of the year.
While Schneider’s once-addressed choice to sign McDougald ended a massive expansion when Kam Chancellor experienced a professional finishing neck injury, he neglected to make other signings that only the program. Indeed, the vast majority of his moves appeared to have the contrary impact.
Terence Garvin and Michael Wilhoite were brilliant, exceptional groups players who shouldn’t have played by any means on safeguard; however, they were constrained right into it; Oday Aboushi battled as a run blocker in eight beginnings at right gatekeeper, and linebacker Arthur Brown didn’t come to the beginning of instructional course before being deferred.
Making an already difficult situation even worse, Schneider also settled on the doomed decision to sign previous Vikings kicker Blair Walsh, who missed game-dominating or tying kicks and associated on only 72% of his field objectives, as a swap for the solid Stephen Hauschka. Any reasonable person would agree that cost-removing measure didn’t help the establishment out, and he never played one more down in the association.

Leave a Reply